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This thesis describes the development and capabilities of the 2020 World Gas
Model (WGM), an updated mixed complementarity problem model of the global
natural gas market derived from the 2014 World Gas Model [18]. The significance
of this research applies to industry professionals and academics alike as the de-
veloped processes and analysis further expands the capabilities and flexibility of
equilibrium modeling. Through an understanding of the current state of the nat-
ural gas market, the WGM determines the economic behavior of various market
players with the deployment of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions
in conjunction with market-clearing conditions. The capabilities of the World Gas
Model are highlighted through two case studies that are of varying international
importance. The case studies are specifically selected from different issues that face
the natural gas market such as a United States and China trade war and U.S. Coast
Guard liquefied natural gas (LNG) inspection workforce forecasting. The goal of
the United States and China Trade War case study is to analyze the potential long-
and short-term affects of a prolonged trade war under several different possible sce-
narios. Results from the study indicate that while increased tariffs on LNG trade
from the U.S. to China greatly reduce the amount of trade volume between the two
countries, the overall economic effect is negligible and of greater concern to other
affected nations. Another found result, is that if the potential geopolitical conse-
quence of China increasing their domestic production of natural gas in an effort
to reduce reliance on imports, this will cause a global natural gas market effect.
The U.S. Coast Guard LNG inspection workforce forecasting case study utilizes the
WGM to provide the future workforce demand for U.S. regulatory personnel and the
associated costs based on the growth of the U.S. LNG industry. The results from
the study indicate that in order to avoid future costs and restriction on the U.S.
LNG industry, the USCG must increase its LNG inspection workforce by a factor
of .3 to 1 from current forecasts.
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Motivation
Natural gas has become a globalized market in which distribution extends
beyond country lines and the capacities of existing pipelines. By understanding
the natural gas processes and current market dynamics, coupled with equilibrium
modeling, the interactions and relationships amongst leading players can be analyzed
in order to draw conclusions about the future implications of various factors and
policy in an ever-growing dynamic global market.
1.1 Significance of The Global Natural Gas Market
In the past two decades the natural gas market has undergone several tech-
nological advances such as horizontal drilling and fracking that have reshaped the
world’s international natural gas market. The global market dynamics have shifted
significantly as a result of these advancements as countries re-position themselves
through their ability to produce, consume and distribute gas on both a domestic
and global scale. For example, since 2000, the United States of America has seen
a 62.5% increase in the total amount of domestic natural gas marketed production
from 572 BCM in 2000 to 930 BCM in 2018, visually represented in Fig. 1.1 [61].
Current predictions by the International Energy Agency in their 2018 World Energy
1
Outlook suggest that natural gas will overtake coal by 2030 to become the world’s
second largest energy source after oil.
Figure 1.1: U.S. Natural Gas Marketed Production [61]
This drastic shift in natural gas production levels has enabled the United
States to change position from being one of the largest importers of gas to becoming
energy self-sufficient over a 10 year period, as well as a world leader in natural gas
exports and reserve capacity. As seen, in Fig. 1.2, the United States is one of
many countries who have, within the past decade, redefined their role in the global
market. Indicated by the different colors in Fig. 1.2, an individual country such as
the United States can be seen to change market behavior through a rapid transition
from 2007 to 2017 by becoming one of the world’s largest net-exporters of natural
gas. Similar transitions are observed in areas such as central Asia and China.
2
Figure 1.2: Global Natural Gas Net Trade - (a) Top Left: Natural Gas
Net Trade 1987 (b) Top Right: Natural Gas Net Trade 1997 (c) Bottom
Left: Natural Gas Net Trade 2007 (d) Bottom Right: Natural Gas Net
Trade 2017 [32]
1.1.1 Shale Gas Revolution
One of the advancements that has brought upon the reshaping of the global
gas market has been the deployment of horizontal drilling and fracking. These tech-
niques have enabled producers to extract massive quantities of natural gas from the
once inaccessible underground shale formations. Prior to the shale gas revolution it
was thought that this process was uneconomic. However, since being proved oth-
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erwise by hydraulic drilling and fracking, over the past two decades the effective
extraction of shale gas has shifted the gas market. For example, in Fig. 1.3, South-
western Energy, a natural gas exploration and production company incorporated in
Delaware and headquartered in Spring, Texas, was able to significantly reduce the
number of days to drill, well-finding and development costs while rapidly increasing
production from 2007 to 2010 through the use of hydraulic fracking.
Figure 1.3: Southwestern Energy Production Cost [1]
Countries around the world have evaluated their shale gas resources and have
sought to rapidly meet their domestic energy demand through the implementation
of shale gas fracking. Most notably, China sits on one of the worlds largest shale gas
reserves, estimated in 2015, by China’s Ministry of Land Resources, as 21.8 trillion
cubic meters
1
worth of technically recoverable natural gas [8], and seeks to meet




2018, the Chinese State Council set an aggressive plan to produce 200 billion cubic
meters (BCM)/year of domestic natural gas by 2020, which, as of 2018, China
produced 155 BCM of domestic natural gas and accounted for 45% of China’s gas
supply [61][8].
1.1.2 Liquefied Natural Gas
The transportation of liquefied natural gas has enabled countries with the
requisite infrastructure to reach markets that would otherwise be uneconomical or
infeasible to reach via pipeline. When considering the demand for natural gas,
many countries, most notably those in Asia and Europe, have been able to meet
their growing energy consumption through the import of LNG and the globalization
of this abundant resource. In the International Energy Agency’s 2019 World Energy
Outlook, Stated Policies Scenario, Liquefied Natural Gas is projected to overtake
pipelines as the main way of trading gas between countries “by the late 2020s”
[33]. In Fig. 1.4 the major trade flows as analyzed by BP’s Statistical Review [48],
can be seen and the elevated significance of LNG’s ability to reach foreign markets
can be visually interpreted when considering what the trade flows would look like
in the absence of LNG. Where blue trade arcs represent LNG flow and red arcs
represent pipeline trade flow, it can be seen that LNG enables a globalized natural
gas market; however, LNG trade retains a degree of localization where significant
flows are found between countries of relative close proximity, i.e., Australia and the
Philippine’s LNG export destinations.
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Figure 1.4: Major Trade Flows [33]
Wood Mackenzie’s Chairman and Chief Analyst Simon Flowers states that
“The LNG market will more than double in size to over 1000 BCM by 2040, a
growth rate eclipsed only by renewables. A niche market not long ago, shipped
LNG volumes will exceed global pipeline exports within six years.”[14] However,
the increased volume of global LNG flow will also increase diversity and competi-
tion as different countries compete for markets of high demand and utilizing their
geographical advantage to that extent. In concurrence with Wood Mackenzie, the
IEA forecasts similar LNG growth by 2040;however, the heightened geographical
competition between markets can be seen in results from IEA’s 2018 World Energy
Outlook New Policies Scenario Fig 1.5 [33]. In Fig. 1.5 it can be seen that LNG
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trade (green) is forecasted, by the IEA, to grow at a rate much greater than pipeline
trade(purple) from 2017 to 2040. The growth in LNG is seen to be mostly attributed
to Asian natural gas demand where countries from around the world seek to meet
the growing demand.
Figure 1.5: Selected LNG and Pipeline Gas Exports to Europe and Asia [33]
Geographical significance will prove to be a key factor for countries, such as
the United States, looking to profit from their shale gas resources and will become a
vital component when determining the validity of investment decisions with regard
to increasing LNG infrastructure. LNG export companies will need the capability to
accurately forecast future developments in order to better secure long term contracts
for risk management in a ever increasingly competitive industry [33].
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1.2 Focus & Outline of this Research
The goal of the research in this thesis is to develop a model that is ready,
relevant, and capable to determine the market behavior of the global natural gas
market to include the production, consumption, wholesale prices, storage capacities
and international trade flows. An updated World Gas Model (WGM) derived from
the 2014 WGM [44][12], utilizing the principles of mixed complementarity problems
is presented in order to allow all players to make decisions simultaneously while
working in regards to optimizing their individual objective function. The significance
of this research is to utilize the developed model to analyze the potential market
behavior that is likely to occur as a result of major development in the global natural
gas market.
This thesis will utilize additional constraints, variables and costs, outlined
in Chapter 2, to model the effects of an international dispute/event as well as a
domestic workforce issue that can be solved through the appropriate modeling of the
global market. The great flexibility of the model presented can be seen through the
analysis in Chapter 3 where both the international and domestic issues are analyzed
for better decision making from all players in the world gas model. Lastly in Chapter
4, the results and contributions made by this thesis as well as the potential for future
research regarding mixed complementarity modeling and the World Gas Model is
discussed.
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1.3 Selected Literature Review
The purpose of this section is to provide a general overview of a selected group
of alternatively developed models versus the 2020 World Gas Model in an effort to
display the differences between the thesis’ derived model and other models found in
the field.
1.3.1 University of Maryland World Gas Model - 2014
The World Gas Model (WGM) is a multi-period numerical equilibrium model
formulated as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP) developed at the University
of Maryland with cooperation from The German Institute for Economic Research
Berlin. The model was initially developed in 2010 based on other modeling efforts
published in [19][20] that established the uniqueness for mixed complementarity gas
models, exemplified by analysis of the North American gas market. The WGM
deploys the use of endogenous decision-making for investments in pipeline, LNG
trade, and storage capacities while considering the growth in demand and produc-
tion expansions. The WGM also provides the capability to model an imperfectly
competitive market through the use of Nash-Cournot market power. At the time of
its initial model formulation in 2010, the WGM included more than 80 countries that
represented over 98% of the global natural gas market production and consumption
in 2005 [12] based on BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy 2008 [53]. In accor-
dance with game theory, the large-scale MCP model includes agents that display
the economic behavior of the various players found in a gas market all of whom have
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objective functions that seek to maximize their net discounted profit. The greatest
advantages of the WGM at the time of development was its level of detail for market
agents, transportation options (pipeline & LNG), and regional coverage when com-
pared to previous models at the time of publication [38][30][11]. In 2014, the WGM
was updated and further developed for analysis of the Panama Canal expansion and
its effects on the LNG industry [44]. In addition to updating the model’s base year
and reference data set, a canal operator player was developed and introduced to the
WGM 2014 which included additional parameters and variables as well as KKT and
market-clearing conditions [44]. This significantly increased the scope of the WGM
from 2010 to 2014 and provided a modern and more accurate representation of the
global gas market at that time.
1.3.2 U.S. Energy Information Agency International Natural Gas
Model
The U.S. Energy Information Agency developed the International Natural Gas
Model (INGM) in 2011 for the purpose of providing a reasonably detailed outlook
for natural gas production, consumption, and international trade to include LNG
and regional prices. Estimates for production included the production source (con-
ventional or unconventional) and the estimates for consumption included data by
demand sector. The INGM is a Linear Programming (LP) formulation that assumes
a naturally competitive market with the objective function that minimizes the nega-
tive of the discounted net cash flows [65]. The model included 61 regions, 3 seasons,
10
7 demand sectors, 5 different natural gas supply types, demand & supply curves, as
well as endogenous capacity expansion decisions. The supply and demand curves
are linear and unit based transportation costs are used all of which allows for the
model to remain linear. Contractual flows for both pipeline and LNG are not taken
into account in the model under the premise that long term trends in the market
will be subject to the conditions where gas will flow to the areas of high demand
value [65].
1.3.3 The Baker Institute World Gas Trade Model
The Baker Institute World Gas Trade Model (BIWGTM) is a dynamic spatial
equilibrium model and was developed by researchers at Rice University in Houston,
Texas utilizing the licensed MarketBuilder software available from Deloitte [42] [27].
The BIWGTM and Deloitte’s MarketBuilder software is an agent-based formulation
which uses interacting autonomous agents to model individual economic behaviors
[40]. Agent-based models (ABM) use microeconomics to model the autonomous
agents desire to maximize profits subject to constraints [45]. This allows for each
agent to behave in their own self-interest without regard for the natural gas market
as a whole. This is similar to the MCP approach as individual players, like agents,
are seeking to maximize their profit and minimize their total cost. The model
calculates a dynamic spatial equilibrium that is not necessarily economically efficient
but ensures that the supply and demand is balanced for each region for every time
period. This eliminates all possibility of arbitrage. The model seeks to maximize
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the net present value of new supply and transportation investments while taking
present and future prices into account. The model solves for the regional natural
gas prices, gas transportation capacity flows and investments, growth in gas reserves,
and regional production and demand [28][27]. The BIWGTM uses the United States
Geological Survey (USGS) assessments for estimating supply-demand curves for the
over 140 global regions that are included in the model. The model has more than
140 supply regions, each with different supply hubs in a sub-region. One of the
limitations of the model is its use of USGS assessments in North America as a basis
for the representation for other global markets which introduces a higher level of
uncertainty, given that in reality no region behaves exactly in the same way with
regards to energy production and demand [28].
1.3.4 University of Cologne (EWI) Global Gas Market Model
The COLUMBUS global gas market model was developed by The Institute
for Energy Economics at the University of Cologne (EWI) in Germany as a MCP
model. The model seeks to optimize the future development of production, trans-
portation, and storage capacities while also optimizing the global gas pipeline and
LNG flows around the world. COLUMBUS uses a vertex/edge approach by repre-
senting the vertices as the production and demand regions in the form of sources and
sinks respectively. The edges are represented as the transportation arcs that come
in the form of pipelines and LNG transportation routes. The model seeks out the
optimization of future profit and development for the various players represented
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in the network. Players are identified as producers, traders, regasifiers, liquefiers,
transmission system operators, and storage operators. In an effort to reduce model
complexity, the researchers at EWI, did not model the LNG transportation network
with a point-to-point but with a hub-and-spoke approach which created a network
of virtual LNG hubs that reduced the number of variables by 60% [29]. The repre-
sentation of the production and consumption of natural gas was done through the
use of an inelastic demand and piece-wise-linear supply function. A limitation on
the model is its assumption for a perfectly competitive global market which inhibits
a real-world representation of actual occurring market power [29] [68].
1.3.5 Summary of Literature Review
Natural Gas Model Review
Model Name WGM -
2014
INGM BIWGTM COLUMBUS WGM -
2020
Developer UMD EIA Rice U. EWI,
Cologne
UMD
Formulation MCP LP Agent-based MCP MCP
Regions >80 61 >140 >110 >160














Table 1.1: Review of Selected Natural Gas Models
The 2020 WGM, as seen in Table 1.1, is one of the most inclusive and repre-
sentative models of the global natural gas market. Through its use of eight different
players each with its own objective function, a vast representation of all international
pipelines, complete network of real-world LNG arcs, and the most current reference
data points available, the WGM is able to represent 98% of the global gas market at
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the time of the model’s base year, 2017, making it one of the most up-to-date and
comprehensive global gas models compared to those previously discussed. Most no-
tably, the 2020 WGM differentiates its-self from the rest of the field through the use
of imperfect competition modeling within an MCP formulation, providing the capa-
bility for a more realistic representation of the gas market. The processes in which
the 2020 WGM was developed, as outlined in Chapter 2, further demonstrate how
thorough and extensive the 2020 WGM is in relation to other model formulations
and previous iterations of the WGM.
14
Chapter 2: World Gas Model 2020 Development
This chapter details the processes in which the WGM 2020 was developed and
how it was expanded upon the previous iterations of the WGM [44][12][19]. First,
the principles of mixed complementarity problems and their relation to the WGM
is presented. Subsequently, the development of WGM players and data collection is
discussed.
2.1 Mixed Complementarity Problems
Market equilibrium models using the mixed complementarity problem (MCP)[18]
have been useful for both perfect and imperfect competition or mixtures thereof. For
energy market models, typically consist of the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condi-
tions to convex player optimization models combined with market-clearing condi-
tions [3][12].
Given a function F ∶ IRn → IRn pure complementarity problem is to find an
x ∈ IR
n
such that for all i:
1. Fi(x) ≥ 0
2. xi ≥ 0
15
3. xi ⋅ Fi(x) = 0
The fundamental mixed form of a complementarity problem (MCP) is similar
to the pure complementarity problem; however, it permits equations Fi(x) = 0
with corresponding free variables and inequalities with non-negative variables. This
correspondence is seen in the case of the WGM through valid KKT conditions.




, an MCP is to find vectors x ∈ IR
n1 , y ∈ IR
n1
such that for all i:
1. Fi(x, y) ≥ 0, xi ≥ 0, xi ⋅ Fi(x) = 0, i = 1, ..., n1
2. Fj+n1(x, y) = 0, yjfree, j = 1, ..., n2
A mixed complementarity program can also be represented in terms of upper
and lower bounds such that for every xi and it’s upper (ui) and lower (li) bounds
satisfy the following conditions:
1. li = xi ⟹ Fi(x) ≥ 0
2. li < xi < ui ⟹ Fi(x) = 0
3. xi = ui ⟹ Fi ≤ 0
where li ≤ ui∀i and li ∈ IR ∪ {−∞}, ui ∈ IR ∪ {+∞}
The upper and lower bounds help in the case of modeling energy markets as they can
represent the characteristics of trade flows such as capacities and contracts [18][12].
The World Gas Model is based on the economic behavior of players acting in
accordance with Nash-Cournot game theory. The assumption is that all players of
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all types in the model are acting towards the goal of maximizing profit under certain
constraints with distinct revenue and associated costs [12]. It should be noted that
WGM is entirely deterministic and there are no elements of uncertainty being taken
into effect in the model. This is due to the nature of equilibrium modeling and
models of large time horizons being utilized primarily as a predictor of trends and
patterns for macro-level decision making.
2.2 Players
In this section, a description of the various players developed for use in the
World Gas Model by previous works [12][11][44] are presented as well as their asso-
ciated objective function and operational constraints.
2.2.1 Producer
Natural gas production encompasses a wide array of natural gas operations and
products. We are only focused on marketed natural gas production, i.e., natural gas
that is available for the market. For each node within the model, there is only
one producer agent that delivers gas to either the node’s trading arm (trader) or,
if applicable, a domestic liquefier. The producer performs based on the objective
function of maximizing of discounted profits. The maximization of discounted profits
17







daysd [πPn(p)dmSALESPpdm − CPpm (SALESPpdm)] − bPpm△Ppm}
(2.1)
The production rate SALES
P
pdm is restricted by a production capacity CAP
PR
pm and









pm ∀d,m (αPpdm) (2.2)









p ∀m (βPpdm) (2.3)
The daily sales rate and investment capacity expansion must be non-negative:
s.t. SALES
P
pdm ≥ 0 ∀d,m (2.4)
s.t. △
P
pm ≥ 0 ∀m (2.5)
A nonlinear, logarithmic, Golombeck marginal production cost function Eq. 2.6 [24]
is used to describe the production cost of fossil fuels. The function is used due to
the increasing and convex form that allows for KKT conditions to be valid. We also
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implement the investment capacity investments from previous years [31].
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P


















The trader agent in the WGM represents the trading arm for a producer in
different markets around the world. The trading arms may or may not be a state-
owned entity or an individual private company with access to different international
markets. An example of the two different trading arms is Gazprom Export LLC,
the state-owned trading arm under Russia’s Gazprom, and Shell International Trad-
ing and Shipping Company Limited, a global business organization that manages
trading arms around the world on behalf of Royal Dutch Shell (United Kingdom).
The WGM takes into account of the different real-world trading operations through
a binary map of all domestic players’ access to different international markets. An
example is the mapping of Gazprom Export’s access to the multiple consumption
nodes found in the European Union via a vast network of pipelines.
Traders maximize their discounted profits that result from selling gas at a
daily rate to marketers for end-use consumption, SALES
T→M
tndm , coupled with a mar-
ket power coefficient, δ
C
tnε[0, 1], and a weighted average of market prices,
(δCtnΠWndm (1 − δCnni) π
W
ndm), resulting from the inverse demand function, ΠWndm, and
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a perfect competition market clearing wholesale price, π
W
ndm. Traders operate the





tndm flows coupled with a cost to inject (τSIndm) and extract (τSXndm). The pur-









tndm (if applicable) are also accounted for by the trader. Lastly,
pipeline transportation costs include a regulated fee τ
Reg
nnidm
plus a congestion fee
τ
A
nnidm based on pipeline usage FLOW
T
nnidm from the trading source n and final

































































The mass balance between the total sales, purchases, flows as well as storage injec-



























daysd (XTRT←Stndm − (1 − Losss)INJT→Stndm) = 0 ∀n, sεS(n(t)), d,m (φTtndm)
(2.9)
All variables are non-negative:
s.t. SALES
T→M
tndm ≥ 0 ∀n, d,m (2.10)
s.t. INJ
T→S
tndm ≥ 0 ∀n, d,m (2.11)
s.t. XTR
T←S
tndm ≥ 0 ∀n, d,m (2.12)
s.t. PURCH
P→T
tndm ≥ 0 ∀n, d,m (2.13)
s.t. PURCH
R→T
tndm ≥ 0 ∀n, d,m (2.14)
s.t. FLOW
T
nnidm ≥ 0 ∀n, d,m (2.15)
2.2.3 Liquefier
LNG liquefaction terminals are represented in the WGM as “liquefiers” that
are able to buy gas from a domestic producer from their dedicated trader via pipeline,
liquefy the gas, and ultimately sell the gas to LNG transportation companies. Each
element of the process is modeled to include associated costs and losses. The lique-












































] − bLlm△Llm} (2.16)
Total sales are constrained by the total capacity, which includes the initial capacity
CAP
L
l plus total investment expansion ∑
m′<m









ldm ≥ 0 ∀d,m(αLldm) (2.17)
The daily sales rate is restricted by the total production purchase rate accounted
for losses from transportation and liquefaction.
s.t. (1 − lossl)PURCHL←Pldm − SALESLldm ≥ 0 ∀d,m(φLldm) (2.18)
All variables are non-negative:
s.t. SALES
L
ldm ≥ 0 ∀d,m (2.19)
s.t. PURCH
L←P
ldm ≥ 0 ∀d,m (2.20)
s.t. △
L
lm ≥ 0 ∀d,m (2.21)
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2.2.4 Regasifier
LNG Regasification terminals are represented by the “regasifier” agent who
buys LNG from various LNG transportation companies, gasifies the LNG, and
sells the gas to the domestic trader or marketer. The regasifiers maximize their
discounted profit from selling to traders SALES
R→T
rdm and marketers SALES
R→M
rdm













rljdm, cost of gasifying LNG C
R
rm (SALESR→T + SALESR→Mrdm )






















































The daily sales rates to both the trader and marketer are constrained by the initial











rdm ≥ 0 ∀d,m (αRrdm) (2.23)
The total amount of gas available for trading and marketing are constrained by the







] ≥ 0 ∀d,m (αRrdm)
(2.24)
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Long-term LNG contracts are taken into account and utilized as a lower bound for








rldm ≥ 0 ∀r, l, d,m(εRrldm) (2.25)
All variables are non-negative:
s.t. SALES
R→T
rdm ≥ 0 ∀d,m (2.26)
s.t. SALES
R→M
rdm ≥ 0 ∀d,m (2.27)
s.t. LNGFLOW
B
rljdm ≥ 0 ∀d,m (2.28)
s.t. △
R
rm ≥ 0 ∀m (2.29)
2.2.5 LNG Shipping Operator
LNG transportation companies are represented by “LNG shipping operators”
who are responsible for buying LNG from liquefiers (l) and selling the maritime
transported LNG to regasifiers (r) located at different ports around the world.
LNG vessels operate at a wide range of LNG load capacities; however, the WGM
distinguishes three different load capacities of size (cεC), detailed load capacities
and costs can be found in Sec. 2.3.2.6. The modeled capacity of each transport
vessel size is the total fleet capacity of active vessels within that size class. The
24











crljdm, canal costs (if applicable) for both
the Suez Canal τ
Stoll
dm and Panama Canal τ
Ptoll



















































The daily LNG flow via LNG vessel (cεC) across route (jεJ) with a distance of
Distrlj is constrained by the daily maximum distance able to be traveled MaxDistc
based on the respective average vessel speed. The total LNG flow capacity across
route (j) with vessel (c) is the initial total fleet capacity for vessel (c) plus the fleet
expansion investment ∑
m′<n
△Bcm′ from all previous time periods. It is assumed LNG
vessels will travel the same route back and forth, once laden and then subsequently
unladen for the return voyage.










LNG flow for the largest capacity vessels, also known as “Q-Max”, are not permitted
for travel via Panama and Suez Canal routes.
s.t. LNGFLOW
B
cε{large},rl,jε{Scanal},dm = 0 ∀r, l, d,m (βBcε{large},rljdm) (2.32)
s.t. LNGFLOW
B
cε{large},rl,jε{Pcanal},dm = 0 ∀r, l, d,m (βBcε{large},rljdm) (2.33)
All variables are non-negative:
s.t. LNGFLOW
B
crljdm ≥ 0 ∀d,m (2.34)
s.t. △
B
cm ≥ 0 ∀m (2.35)
2.2.6 Canal Operator
The Panama and Suez Canal provide shorter route distances for LNG trans-
portation companies for additional costs and fees based on congestion and ves-
sel load. A canal operator player is defined as the agent who provides the canal
































































dm ≥ 0 ∀d,m(αPcanaldm ) (2.38)
All variables are non-negative:
s.t. LNGFLOW
Scanal
dm ≥ 0 ∀d,m (2.39)
s.t. LNGFLOW
Pcanal
dm ≥ 0 ∀d,m (2.40)
2.2.7 Transmission System Operator
Transmission system operators (TSO) are responsible for the efficient alloca-
tion of gas flow between pipelines, defined independently as arc (a), with access
to various markets. The TSO maximizes the discounted profit from providing gas


































adm is restricted by the maximum initial available pipeline
capacity CAP
A
am for the same arc and the sum of all previous time period expansions
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adm ≥ 0 ∀a, d,m(αAadm) (2.42)
All variables are non-negative:
s.t. SALES
A
adm ≥ 0 ∀d,m (2.43)
s.t. △
A
am ≥ 0 ∀m (2.44)
2.2.8 Storage Operator
Storage operators work in conjunction with traders, providing storage capac-
ity during lower consumption periods. The operation of storage facilities is gov-
erned by the injection SALES
SI
sdm and extraction SALES
SX
sdm flows. The storage









sdm minus a total storage capacity investment








sm , and a




sm . Carbon emission costs are also accounted for
CC
ton































The injection rate SALES
SI
sdm is constrained by the total injection capacity resulting
from an initial capacity CAP
SI
sm and the aggregate yearly expansions ∑
m′<m
△SIsm′ .





sm , and aggregate yearly expansions ∑
m′<m
△SXsm′ . In order to
maintain storage facility performance, the total amount of gas extracted in a season
is constrained by the amount of working gas volume WG
S
sm and the sum of yearly





























Days(SALESSXsdm) ≥ 0 ∀m(αSWsdm) (2.48)















sm ∀m(ρSWm ) (2.51)
All variables are non-negative:
s.t. SALES
SI




sdm ≥ 0 ∀d,m (2.53)
s.t. △
SI
sm ≥ 0 ∀m (2.54)
s.t. △
SX
sm ≥ 0 ∀m (2.55)
s.t. △
SW
sm ≥ 0 ∀m (2.56)
2.2.9 Market-Clearing Conditions
First, the total sales from an individual producer must equal the sum of all











t(p)dm ∀p, d,m (πPpdm) (2.57)
The total injection volume over a time period for an individual storage operator
is equal to the total amount of injection performed by a trader during that same







tsdm ∀s, d,m (τSIsdm) (2.58)
The same constraint logic applies for the extraction capacity during a time period







tsdm ∀s, d,m (τSXsdm) (2.59)
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The pipeline capacity for a pipeline of arc (a) equals the total volume-metric flow







tadm ∀a, d,m (τAadm) (2.60)
The total sales from an individual liquefier to LNG shipping operators equals the












rljdm ∀l, d,m (πLl dm) (2.61)
The total of all LNG flows across all routes (j) from all liquefiers to all available







rljdm ∀r, l, j, d,m (τBr ljdm) (2.62)
Both the Panama and Suez Canal’s capacities are equal to the total amount of















crljdm ∀jε{Scanal}, d,m (τScanaltolldm ) (2.64)
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The final demand market-clearing condition determines the wholesale price of gas
for an individual market (n) based on the linear inverse demand curve equation,
where INT
W
ndm represents the intercept, and the slope of the inverse demand curve
is represented by SLP
W
















tndm ∀n, d,m (πWndm) (2.65)
The resulting network that was developed through the shared use of parameters
and variables found in the market-clearing conditions, shown visually in Fig. 2.1,
demonstrates the inter-connectivity of all players within the WGM. This underlying
network of market-clearing conditions, in conjunction with KKT conditions, pro-
vides the WGM with the ability to reach market equilibrium for all players and
countries within the model.
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Figure 2.1: WGM Network of Market-Clearing Conditions
1
1




The model utilizes open source data found primarily from BP’s 2019 Statistical
Review of World Energy [48], International Gas Union’s 2019 World LNG Report
[35], and the United States Energy Information Agency’s (EIA) 2019 Annual Energy
Outlook [33]. The base model year data was taken from the year 2017 in order to
provide a complete set of data for all players in the same calendar year, this was
due to the availability of data from each agency’s report.
2.3.2 Player Data
2.3.2.1 Consumer/Marketer
The consumption reference data was taken from BP’s 2019 Statistical Review
of World Energy from the 2017 base year and utilized each individual country’s
growth over a 5-year period to forecast future values for that country’s demand as
well as the global growth rate over the same time period. For example, Australia’s
natural gas consumption growth rate per annum from 2012 to 2017 was 3.1%. This
growth rate was then used in conjunction with the global gas demand growth rate
from 2012 to 2017 (2.0%) and a estimated growth rate per annum for each future
time period to forecast Australia’s future natural gas demands for the subsequent
model years. The growth rates were used together in the following equation that
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solves for individual country demand over a 5-year period:




D=Domestic Natural Gas Demand
dr=Domestic Natural Gas Demand Growth Rate per Annum
∆gr= Change in global Natural Gas Demand Growth Rate per Annum from
yi−1toyi
Eq. 2.66 takes advantage of each individual country’s growth rate over the
same time period as the model as well as the overall global growth rate change.
Through implementing an overall global growth rate change in the forecasting of ref-
erence demand values, the globalization of the natural gas market can be accounted
for. This implementation allows the user of the WGM to determine global market
behavior due to global growth rates of their determination. For the base model, the
global growth rate increases to 2.2% per annum by 2022 and then linearly decreases
to 1.0% by 2037. This was done based on the International Energy Agency’s (IEA)
Sustainable Development Scenario in which “natural gas consumption increases over
the next decade at an annual average rate of 0.9% before reaching a high point by
the end of the 2020s. After this, accelerated deployment of renewables and energy
efficiency measures, together with a pickup in production of biomethane and later
of hydrogen, begins to reduce consumption” [33]. The calculated sum of each indi-
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vidual country’s demand in the model versus the forecasted global growth based on
growth rate per annum can be seen in Fig. 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Total Sum of WGM Demand vs. Forecasted Global Demand
(BP Statistical Review 2019) [48]
2.3.2.2 Producer
The production reference data was similarly taken primarily from BP’s 2019
Statistical Review of World Energy from the 2017 base year and utilized each in-
dividual country’s growth over a 5-year period to forecast future values for that
country’s production as well as the global growth rate over the same time period.
For example, Colombia’s natural gas production growth rate per annum from 2012
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to 2017 was 1.3%. This growth rate was then used in conjunction with the global
gas production growth rate from 2012 to 2017 (2.0%) and a estimated growth rate
per annum for each future time period to forecast Colombia’s future natural gas
production for the subsequent model years. The growth rates were used together in
the following Eq. 2.67:




P=Domestic Natural Gas Production
pr=Domestic Natural Gas Production Growth Rate per Annum
∆gr=Change in global Natural Gas Production Growth Rate per Annum from
yi−1toyi
Eq. 2.67 takes advantage of each individual country’s growth rate over the same
time period as the model as well as the overall global growth rate change. Through
implementing overall global growth rate change in the forecasting of reference pro-
duction values, the globalization of the natural gas market can be accounted for.
This implementation allows the user to determine global market behavior due to
global growth rates of their determination. For the base model, the global growth
rate increases to 2.3% per annum by 2022 and then linearly decreases to 1.1% by
2037. This was performed based on the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) Sus-
tainable Development Scenario in which “natural gas consumption increases over
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the next decade at an annual average rate of 0.9% before reaching a high point by
the end of the 2020s. After this, accelerated deployment of renewables and energy
efficiency measures, together with a pickup in production of biomethane and later
of hydrogen, begins to reduce consumption” [33]. The calculated sum of each indi-
vidual country’s production in the model versus the forecasted global growth based
on growth rate per annum can be seen visually in Fig. 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Total Sum of WGM Production vs. Forecasted Global Pro-
duction [33]
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2.3.2.3 Transmission System Operator
The transmission system operator(TSO) or pipeline operator data was pri-
marily taken from BP’s 2019 Statistical Review of World Energy [48] as well as the
Global Gas & Oil Network’s Global Fossil Infrastructure Tracker [22]. BP’s Statis-
tical Review provides information on many of the major international pipeline lines
that are considered in the model. The Global Fossil Infrastructure Tracker was used
to provide additional information to supplement BP’s Statistical Review in regards
to 2017 natural gas movement such as smaller scale developments. In addition to
these sources, future pipeline developments and considerations were found through
various online news sources that highlighted any international pipeline projects that
are in construction, approved, or in consideration. An example of an anticipated
pipeline that was used in the model would be the Altai Gas Pipeline. The Altai Gas
Pipeline is reported to come online within the next decade (2027) and will provide
30 BCM per year of natural gas from Russia to China [41]. The major pipelines
that were added to the model and not found in BP’s Statistical Review of World
Energy includes but is not limited to:
1. Alliance Pipeline System + Foothills (Canada to U.S.) – Runs from West-
ern Canadian Sedimentary Basin through North Dakota ending in Chicago,
started in 2000 expands in 2021 [49].
2. Altai Gas Pipeline (Russia to China) – Runs from Western-Siberia into China’s
Xinjiang province, expected to be online in late 2020s [41].
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3. Arab Gas Pipeline (Israel to Jordan) – Runs from Israel to Jordan completed
in 2019 and online in early 2020 [58].
4. Gasoducto del Noreste Argentino Gas Pipeline (Bolivia to Argentina) – Runs
from Bolivia to Argentina, online in September 2019 [4].
5. Iraq-Kuwait Pipeline (Iraq to Kuwait) – Runs from Iraq to Kuwait however
our model does not include Iraq, so the pipeline is connected to the nearby
country of Iran. Online in 2019 [21].
6. Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (Azerbaijan to Turkey + Other Europe) – Runs
from Azerbaijan to Europe. Construction was started in 2015 and inaugurated
in 2018 [57].
7. Mier Monterrey Gas Pipeline (U.S. to Mexico) – Runs from Starr County
in Texas to Monterrey, Neuvo Leon in Mexico. The 85-mile pipeline started
construction in the year 2003 and has been online since 2017 [56].
8. Gas Atacama Pipeline (Argentina to Chile) – Runs from Salta Argentina to
Mejilones in Chile. The 585-mile pipeline began construction in 1997 and
finished in 1999 [15].
9. Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline (Nigeria to Algeria) – Currently still in the prospect
phase and our model plans for this to be online in the 2020s [5].
10. GASBOL (Bolivia to Brazil) – Runs from Bolivia’s gas fields to south-east
regions in Brazil. Operational in 1999. Expansions completed in March 2000
[52].
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11. East-West Gas Pipeline (Turkmenistan to Russia) – Finished in 2015 [51].
12. Dolphin Gas Project (Oman to United Arab Emirates) – Runs from Qatar’s
North Field into Oman and into United Arab Emirates. Operational in the
year 2003. An expansion also occurred in 2006 [50].
13. Antonio Ricaurte Pipeline (Columbia to Venezuela) – Runs from Columbia to
Venezuela and came online in 2008 [47].
2.3.2.4 Liquefier
Liquefier data was taken primarily from the International Gas Union’s 2019
World LNG Report [35] and the Global Fossil Infrastructure Tracker (GFIT) [22].
The data collection process began with analysis of the leading liquefaction coun-
tries throughout the world and determining which would be placed in the model.
Using a selection criteria, countries that contributed at least 0.5% to global market
share of LNG exports were placed into the WGM. Table 2.1 outlines the countries
their respective total liquefaction capacities as of 2017. Note, the United States of
America and Russia were separated by region for increased analysis detail. Total
liquefaction capacity was taken from IGU’s World LNG Report and supplemented
by the GFIT. Consideration was taken for all operating LNG liquefaction plants
within a country’s borders to be included in the initial capacity, as listed in Table
2.1. LNG liquefaction plants that are currently under construction or are awaiting a
final investment decision are included in the WGM as allowable capacity expansions
for a predetermined time period [35][22]. LNG Liquefaction plant costs and losses
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World Gas Model - Natural Gas Liquefaction Nodes















United Arab Emirates 1.8% 28.9
Russia - East 1.5% 45.3
Russia - West 2.3% 70.0
United States - Gulf 4.5% 198.5
United States - Alaska 0.0% 0.1
Peru 1.4% 17.0
Trinidad & Tobago 3.7% 57.8
Total 99.8% 1572.5
Table 2.1: Liquefier Nodes [35][22]
per million cubic meter (mcm) were taken as a fixed linear value for all countries as
$125,000/mcm of natural gas [55].
2.3.2.5 Regasifier
Regasifier data was taken primarily from the International Gas Union’s 2019
World LNG Report [35] and the Global Fossil Infrastructure Tracker (GFIT) [22].
The data collection process began with analysis of the leading regasification coun-
tries throughout the world and determining which would be placed in the model.
Using a selection criteria, countries that contributed at least 0.25% to global market
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share of LNG imports were placed into the WGM. Table 2.2 outlines the countries
their respective total liquefaction capacities as of 2017. Note, the United States of
America and Mexico were separated by region for increased analysis detail.
Total regasification capacity was taken from IGU’s World LNG Report and
supplemented by the GFIT. Consideration was taken for all operating LNG regasi-
fication plants within a country’s borders to be included in the initial capacity, as
listed in Table 2.2. LNG regasification plants that are currently under construction
or are awaiting a final investment decision are included in the WGM as allowable
capacity expansions for a predetermined time period [35][22]. LNG regasification
plant costs and losses per million cubic meter (mcm) were taken as a fixed linear
value for all countries as $30,000/mcm of natural gas [39].
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World Gas Model - Natural Gas Regasification Nodes























United Arab Emirates 0.8% 36.7
Mexico - Atlantic 0.70% 21.4
Mexico - Pacific 1.00% 42.5
U.S.A. - Everett, MA 0.2% 81.4
U.S.A. - Cove Point, MD 0.2% 77.5





Table 2.2: Regasifier Nodes [35][22]
2.3.2.6 LNG Shipping Operator
Data for the LNG shipping operator came primarily from IGU’s World LNG
Report. The most critical information when modeling the LNG shipping player
were the characteristics of the LNG fleet. The global LNG fleet was comprised of
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478 vessels at the end of 2017 and 525 at the end of 2018, a 10% growth in fleet
capacity in 1 year. Modeling the fleet was first broken down by vessel size into
three categories (small, medium, large). The average LNG vessel capacity is around
175,000 cubic meters(cm) of LNG [35]. This was chosen as the capacity know in
the WGM as a “medium” LNG vessel, which is assumed to travel around 19 knots.
Following IGU’s report, it is found that in 2017 there was 167 vessels of this size
(+/-25,000 cm) which gives a total fleet capacity for “medium” vessels of 29.225
mcm. “Small” LNG vessels were modeled as the next most represented vessel size
in industry. Vessels smaller than the “medium” vessel are most commonly around
125,000 cm (+/-25,000 cm) of capacity and can travel up to 21 knots. In 2017,
there were 175 vessels that fell into this size range, providing an average “small”
vessel fleet capacity of 21.875 mcm. “Large” vessels were modeled as those vessels
that are too large for the Panama Canal a well-known industry example is that of
the Q-max ships most owned by Qatar. These “large” vessels were modeled to have
average capacities of 240,000 cm and be able to operate at 19 knots. In the WGM,
based on IGU data, it was determined that there are 45 vessels of this size (+/-
25,000 cm) for a total “large” vessel fleet capacity of 10.8 mcm [35].
An integral component to the performance of the LNG shipping operator is
the proper modeling of the various routes that vessels can take to reach their final
destination. The model holds every route possible from each liquefier to every
regasifier. From each liquefier (l) to regasifier (r) there are three routes: through the
Panama Canal, through the Suez Canal, and by avoiding the canals. This produced
{(l) × (r) × 3} routes for a total of 1,653 possible routes that the WGM considers
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while the LNG shipping operator determines its most profitable LNG routes. Each
route has a unique nautical distance [54] which was used to calculate the cost from
liquefier (l) to regasifier (r) in $USD/mcm(NG). The shipping cost was calculated
through Eq. 2.68 by taking an average spot charter rate in 2017 of $44,500 USD
[35] and the respective average vessel speed V esselSpeedc and total fleet capacity












The LNG fleet capacity expansion and laid-up capacity
4
were taken into ac-
count in order to allow the WGM to adjust fleet capacity based on demand and
real-world conditions. By calculating the $(USD)/mcm cost of building a new ves-
sel of size “small”, “medium”, and “large” the WGM is able to make an endogenous
investment capacity decision, bounded by an upper capacity expansion limit. A
laid-up capacity was taken as the number of vessels in year 2017 that were retired
or taken out of commission in order to reflect the aging of the LNG fleet and the
need for increased investment.
2.3.2.7 Canal Operator
The canal operator data was taken directly from both the Panama and Suez
Canal authorities [59][60]. In order to accurately model the cost of using the Panama
4
laid-up capacity: idle/unavailable LNG fleet capacity due the withholding of vessels from
commercial operations for a period of time.
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Canal for an LNG vessel, the toll tariffs that were in place for 2017 were used in the
base year of the WGM. The toll tariffs are based on the LNG gas carrier specific
tolls found in Table 2.3
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from the Panama Canal Authority (PCA) [59]. The
maximum Panama Canal LNG capacity was taken from the daily total number of
LNG vessels allowed to transit the canal. The restrictions in place by the PCA allow
for a maximum of four LNG vessels per day as of 2020 [46]; however, in the WGM
base year of 2017 a maximum of two LNG vessels traveled the Panama Canal in a
day. The growth of the Panama Canal, in regards to LNG vessel transits, is modeled
as a gradual linear increase over time with the assumption that canal efficiency and
overall capacity will increase with demand [17].
Table 2.3: Panama Canal Authority LNG Vessel Tolls
[59]
Tolls - LNG Vessels







Continued on next page
5
laden: holding LNG cargo
6
ballast: without LNG cargo
7
ballast(roundtrip): without cargo for both canal transits
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Table 2.3 – continued from previous page




Rest $1.96 $1.71 $1.50
In order to accurately model the cost of using the Suez Canal for an LNG
vessel, the toll tariffs that are in place since 2015 were used in the base year of the
WGM (2017). The toll tariffs are based on the LNG gas carrier specific tolls found
in Fig. 2.4 from the Suez Canal Authority [60]. The maximum Suez Canal LNG
capacity was taken from the largest daily total of LNG vessels in history that have
transited the canal, this equates to around 113 mcm/day [6].
Figure 2.4: Suez Canal Authority LNG Vessel Tolls [60]
2.3.2.8 Storage Operator
Data for the storage operator primarily came from the EIA and includes the
working and reserve storage capacity for every country. Future storage capacities
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beyond the base year are determined endogenously by the model through capacity
expansion investment decisions. The data for the capacity expansion costs came
from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The development costs
per mcm is around $353,000 USD for a standard 6-12 cycle salt cavern in the Gulf
Coast of the United States [13].
2.4 Calibration
The model was calibrated according to past performance history as well as
economic outlooks from widely used and available sources. These sources include
IGU’s World LNG Report [35], EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook [64], and the IEA’s
World Energy Outlook [33]. All sources reflected the state and projections of the
natural gas market in 2017 in order to ensure full data coverage for the base year.
Past performance data was used to project future short term performance based on
BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy. Past performance, such as the average
growths experienced in the last 5-10 years, provide a baseline for the next 5-10 years
when used in conjunction with global future outlooks from other sources. By looking
at data from both the past and projections to the future, a reference data set was
developed to calibrate the production and demand for each individual node. For
the purpose of calibration, geographical regions were designed in order to calibrate
objectively based on model output by region. Calibration was complete when the
model determined the production and consumption for every region within 5% of the
reference data set. Results of the base year calibration are seen below in Fig. 2.5 for
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consumption by region and Fig. 2.6 for production by region, note all regions within
model are to within 5% of reference levels for both production and consumption.
Figure 2.5: Consumption Calibration by Region
8
8
Consumption calibration levels shown are the calculated percentage of the WGM output to
the reference consumption levels
50
Figure 2.6: Production Calibration by Region
9
9
Production calibration levels shown are the calculated percentage of the WGM output to the
reference production levels
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Chapter 3: Model Analysis
3.1 U.S. and China Trade War
3.1.1 Background
The trade war between the United States and China that has evolved since
mid 2017 has been of great concern for the natural gas industry as both the largest
international economies battle. The natural gas industry realized the effects of the
trade war beginning in September 2018 when a 10% punitive tariff was levied on U.S.
LNG exports in response to U.S. levied tariffs on Chinese imports. Later in June
of 2019, in response to an increase in U.S. levied tariffs, the Chinese government
imposed a 25% tariff on U.S. LNG imports. The realized effects were shown by
China’s decrease of U.S. LNG imports by 88.0% from 2.92 BCM in 2018 to 0.35
BCM in 2019. Fig. 3.1 displays the sharp decline in U.S. exports to China despite
U.S. LNG exports continuing to grow through 2019. Fig. 3.1 also displays the tariff’s
effects as the decline in U.S. exports to China start in late 2018 and continues until
eventually reaching zero shipments through 2019, assisted by the tariff increase in
the June 2019.
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Figure 3.1: U.S. LNG Exports to China [25]
China’s total LNG imports for 2018 were 73.0 BCM which makes U.S. LNG
imports only 4% of the total amount imported in 2018 prior to the trade war effects.
By contrast in 2019, China’s U.S. LNG imports represented only 0.4% of total
Chinese LNG imports, shown graphically in Fig. 3.2. It is seen that, most notably,
Australia, Malaysia and Russia have increased LNG exports to China due, not only,
to the rise in demand but the sharp decline of U.S. LNG imports as a result of the
tariffs and on-going trade war.
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The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the potential long-term and short-
term effects of the on-going trade war between the United States and China with
specific regard to the consequences following the imposed tariffs, China’s domestic
natural gas production and resulting decline in U.S. LNG exports to China. A Base
Case is presented in which zero tariffs are imposed and forecasts for U.S. and Chinese
demand and production levels are held consistent with the methodology found in
Sec. 2.2. Starting with the Base Case as the initial solution for computational
purposes, all subsequent cases are outlined in Table 3.1 and are solved using the
results from the Base Case.
1
10 million metric tons LNG = 22.1 million cubic meters
54
WGM U.S. & China Trade War - Case Studies
Case Study Chinese Import Tariff Chinese Domestic Production
(% of forecasted total)
1 -25T/100P 25% 100%
2 -25T/150P 25% 150%
3 -10T/100P 10% 100%
4 -10T/150P 10% 150%
5 -5T/100P 5% 100%
6 -5T/150P 5% 150%




Table 3.1: Trade War Case Studies
3.1.3 Analysis & Results
The U.S. & China trade war analysis was run on a 5-year interval from a base
year of 2017 to 2037. This time frame provided solutions for years 2017,2022, 2027,
2032, & 2037. First, the Base Case, outlined in Table 3.1, was solved for prior to
any other cases. The solutions from the base case provided an initial solution for
the remaining cases for the solver to determine a final solution from. This ensured
that the same local equilibrium was first initially used, indicating that differences in
solutions were due to all things being equal, the differing case scenarios as opposed to
the potential for the solver to determine a different solution simply from a different
initial starting point.
The results from the Base Case were used as a benchmark in comparison to
all other results from the different scenarios. In order to determine the accuracy
of the Base Case, the reference production, consumption and LNG exports for the
years 2017 and 2022 are considered as previously discussed in Sec. 2.4.
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3.1.3.1 Tariff Effects on LNG Trade
One of the major foreseen effects that the U.S. & Chinese tariffs have is the
reorganization of the global LNG trade flows. However, the extent and future im-
plications that a long-term tariff has on the global LNG market cannot be fully
understood without sufficient modeling and analysis. Cases 1,3, &5 present differ-
ent scenarios in which the tariffs are adjusted based on recently used metrics and
compared against the base case for analysis. One obvious and previously mentioned
result for an increase in tariffs is the reduction in total LNG flow from the U.S. to
China. As seen in Fig. 3.3, the rise in tariffs is correlated with a decrease in LNG
flow.
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Figure 3.3: Chinese LNG Imports from USA - Gulf of Mexico by Case
It is not until Chinese domestic demand becomes large enough in year 2037 that
for the highest tariff case scenario of 25% for cases 1&2 that we seen a resumption
in U.S. Chinese LNG trade. There is marginal improvement for increased trade flow
when the tariff is ≤ 5% (Case 5); however, this figure is still significantly lower than
when there is no tariff imposed. These results concur with recent real-world actions
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and common understanding regarding LNG trade between the U.S. and China. For
as long as the tariff on U.S. LNG exports to China remains at a level greater than
5% we can assume that there will be little to no LNG trade between the two nations.
Due to the globalized nature of the LNG market, it is predicted that the effects
of the LNG tariffs between the U.S. and China will be far reaching beyond just the
flow between the two nations. First, an understanding of China’s LNG sources
comes into consideration for the Base Case. In Fig. 3.4, a visual representation of
the global LNG trade flows to China is displayed where the darker and thicker the
arc the greater the amount of LNG flow. It is seen that a majority of the LNG
exports to China are from the relatively local regions such as Australia, countries
in the Middle East, and the remainder of the exporting Asia pacific countries.
Figure 3.4: Chinese LNG Imports Map
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Taking the regional sourcing of China’s LNG into consideration, it is antici-
pated that the tariff-imposed reduction in U.S. LNG flow to China has an altering
effect on China’s local LNG sources. This effect can be seen in Fig. 3.5 where it
is noted that while U.S. - Gulf of Mexico trade flow to China decreases with the
increase in tariffs to 25%,10%, &5%, cases 1,3,&5 respectively, the average yearly
trade to China from Australia is increased. This concurs with recent observations
as since September of 2018 to September of 2019, Australian LNG exports to China
have risen 33% [10]. It can be expected that for as long as the tariffs remain and
Chinese natural gas demand increases over time, as forecasted, Australia and other
local Pacific nations are well poised to gain from a prolonged trade war.
Figure 3.5: Chinese LNG Imports
While much focus has been on U.S. LNG trade with China, implications on the
pipeline transmission systems supplying a majority of Chinese natural gas demand
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should also be evaluated. According to BP Statistical Review, 70% of all Chinese
natural gas pipeline imports come from Turkmenistan at around 33 BCM/yr [48].
In regards to the effects of import tariffs on U.S. LNG, no effect can be found on
the pipeline trade flow between central Asia and China. Fig. 3.6 represents this
visually as the difference in natural gas flow remains unchanged with varying U.S.
LNG tariffs.
Figure 3.6: Turkmenistan Natural Gas Exports to China by Case & Year
The tariffs imposed on U.S. trade to China has altered the distribution of
LNG exports around the globe. Further insight into the final destination and op-
portunities for U.S. LNG exports must be examined. A quick analysis of U.S. LNG
exports and their final destination market is seen in Fig. 3.7. It can be seen that in
the Base Case, a majority of the U.S. LNG exports are directed toward the Pacific
Asian markets, most notably China, Japan & South Korea.
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Figure 3.7: U.S. Global LNG Exports - Base Case
Taking this into account, the effect that Chinese tariffs have on these trade
patterns is found to be of significance for Japan and South Korea as countries in
high demand and higher global wholesale prices are ideal for U.S. exports. These
effects are seen visually in the results of Fig. 3.8 where U.S. LNG exports, as a result
of increased tariffs, compete for increased market share of the Japanese markets.
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Figure 3.8: U.S. Global LNG Exports & Year
It is seen that with the decrease in Chinese LNG imports from the U.S., as
a result of increased tariffs, U.S. LNG exports to Japan increase. The question
arises as to why the United States increases its Japanese LNG market share when
the shipping cost is one of the largest in the world. Further analysis into the WGM
results reveals that with China’s investment into alternative regional sources of LNG,
most notably Australia, has drawn competitive supply from other local importing
countries. In Fig. 3.9, it can seen that for each year in the case study, U.S. LNG
market share for the Japanese import market increases with the increase in tariffs.
This comes as a result of Australia’s potential increased market share of gas imports
in China due to the absence of the U.S. LNG imports there. From the results of
the WGM, the United States would continue LNG exports to Asia-Pacific countries,
such as Japan or South Korea, in response to the tariffs, capturing LNG markets
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with remaining demand as other localized suppliers gain share of Chinese LNG
import demand.
Figure 3.9: U.S. vs Australia LNG Exports to Japan
3.1.3.2 Increased Tariffs & Chinese Natural Gas Production
Cases 1,3, & 5 all assume that Chinese domestic production remains as fore-
casted previously. However, China holds one of the greatest shale gas reserves [8],
and plans to increase domestic production, therefore, reducing reliance on imports.
With the potential for bolstered motivation in boosting domestic production due to
the trade war, Cases 2,4,6, &7 address the scenarios in which China increases its
domestic production capacity to levels stated by the Chinese State Council, defined
as 200 BCM/yr by 2020 [8]. The WGM achieves this increased level of domestic
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production by elevating the reference production of China by 150% ultimately pro-
viding an average domestic production level of 243 BCM/yr by 2022, shown visually
in Fig. 3.10.
Figure 3.10: 150% Chinese WGM Domestic Natural Gas Production by Year
It is suspected that all natural gas imports, both pipeline and LNG, will be
impacted directly by increased Chinese domestic production. An analysis was per-
formed to determine those countries that are most affected from increased Chinese
production coupled with a pro-longed trade war. First, the LNG exports by region
were analyzed for each case with special regard towards the difference between Cases
1,3,5, Base & 2,4,6,7. It is noticed in Fig. 3.11, that the LNG exports for Africa,
Asia Pacific, Middle East, & South America are most affected by the increase in
Chinese domestic production. It is significant that U.S. LNG exports remain un-
changed regardless of Chinese domestic production levels and import tariffs. These
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results highlight the dependency that some LNG markets have on China.
Figure 3.11: Average Yearly LNG Exports by Region & Case
The same results were found while analyzing the potential effects that in-
creased Chinese production would have on global pipeline trade. As central Asia
is China’s largest supplier of pipeline gas imports, results indicated that the region
with the greatest impact from increased Chinese production was in fact Central Asia
and focus was given specifically on that region. Each country in the central Asian
region, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Russia was analyzed in terms
of pipeline exports against all cases. Fig. 3.12 highlights the regional dependency
that Central Asian states have on Chinese domestic demand and their susceptibility
to increased Chinese domestic production.
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Figure 3.12: Average Yearly Net Pipeline by Region & Case
The significance of increased Chinese domestic production can be seen primar-
ily in the relationship between Turkmenistan natural gas production and pipeline
exports. Referring to Fig. 3.13, it can be seen that a large portion of Turkmenistan’s
natural gas exports are sent to China as Turkmenistan supplied China with 33.3
BCM of natural gas in 2017 [48]. This is significant as the majority of Turk-
menistan’s natural gas production is devoted to exports only to China followed by
the domestic demand of Turkmenistan. This indicates that there is a direct inverse
relationship between the levels of Chinese domestic production and the domestic
production of Turkmenistan.
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Figure 3.13: Turkmenistan Natural Gas Consumption, Imports, and
Production in Year 2017
3.1.3.3 Consumer Surplus
Due to the endogenous and linear nature of the inverse demand curve, de-
termining consumer surplus was the preferred method for analyzing the economic
well-being of a society at node n from the WGM results. Consumer surplus is
computed for each country and year included in the model via Eq. 3.1. Visually
represented in Fig. 3.14, consumer surplus is the area under the inverse demand
curve up to equilibrium (e), identified as the area in red, which is determined via
the difference between the inverse demand intercept, ∑dεDays INTWndm, and whole-
sale price, ∑dεDays πWndm, for a node, n, over all seasons, d, in a year, m, multiplied
by (1
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This overall well-being can be examined globally, regionally, and on a national scale
via the WGM. The effects of the trade war and potential increase in Chinese domestic
production of natural gas are first analyzed on a regional basis. In Fig. 3.15, the
impact of the increased tariffs alone are negligible according to WGM results. The
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greater impact on the global natural gas market is the increase in domestic Chinese
production. With the United States only providing 2% of Chinese LNG imports in
2017, the consumer surplus impact due to an absence of U.S. & China natural gas
trade has minimal impact and easily absorbed by other relatively local countries
with already larger market share and the capacity to meet Chinese demand.
Figure 3.15: WGM Consumer Surplus by Region - U.S. China Trade War
The greatest global consumer surplus impact stems from a significant rise in
domestic Chinese production irregardless of the trade war. China has motivation to
boost natural gas production in an effort to decrease reliance on imports and when
69
posed with an issue of a trade war with the world’s biggest economy, the motivation
increases. The results from the WGM demonstrate this as the consumer surplus
for China greatly increases with a rise in domestic production levels to the level
expressed earlier by the Chinese State Council (200 BCM/yr by 2020). The impact
can be seen visually in Fig. 3.16, where the increase in consumer surplus can be
directly attributed to the rise in production versus the rise in tariffs over the base
case.
Figure 3.16: WGM Consumer Surplus - China
The effects of Chinese production are seen globally, specifically in regions of
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high demand and low production such as Europe and the remainder of the Asia-
Pacific. In Fig. 3.17 and Fig. 3.16, it can be seen that the improvement of the overall
consumer surplus is felt strongly in these two regions correlating to an increase in
Chinese production. The same level of impact is lessened in other regions of the
world where production and net exports are greater. These results can be found
visually in Appendix B.
Figure 3.17: WGM Consumer Surplus - Europe
In conclusion, the rise in tariffs due to a prolonged trade war show minimal
effect of the overall well-being of the natural gas economy. The significant aspect of
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the trade war is China’s potential response to reduce reliance on exporting countries
to avoid future trade conflicts. If China were to increase production levels as stated,
it would be a net benefit to the world by measure of consumer surplus. The elevated
Chinese production levels would also be negligible for the U.S. natural gas market
as exporters would shift focus towards more local consumers with increased prices
and demand.
3.2 U.S. Coast Guard LNG Inspection Workforce
3.2.1 Background
The United States Coast Guard (USCG) is the United States’ oldest con-
tinuous sea-going service and represents one of the nation’s five armed services.
Comprised of 40,992 active duty military members and 8,577 civilian employees, as
of 2018, and under the Department of Homeland Security, the USCG is charged
with missions such as maritime security, law enforcement, search and rescue, and
marine environmental protection. The Coast Guard has both an international and
domestic presence divided into nine districts, Fig. 3.18, each deals with the duty of
upholding the USCG’s missions in their respective area of responsibility.
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Figure 3.18: United States Coast Guard Domestic Force Lay-down[9]
An integral component to the nation’s economy and national security is the
regulation of commercial vessels in U.S. waters and ports. The regulation of com-
mercial vessels falls under the responsibility of the Coast Guard throughout the
nation’s maritime domain. The Coast Guard boards and inspects, on average, 122
vessels per day and monitors the transit of 2,557 commercials ships throughout U.S.
ports. This level of regulation requires an experienced and competent workforce
in order to effectively ensure the safety and security of the commercial shipping
industry, including transportation of LNG. As of 2019, “the Coast Guard’s marine
inspection staff consists of 533 military and 138 civilian personnel”, 71 of whom
are qualified and certified to conduct LNG vessel inspections, roughly 10.6% of the
total marine inspection workforce [16]. Under the United States Code of Federal
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Regulations (CFR) 46 CFR § 153, Every LNG vessel operating in U.S. national
waters and ports is required to obtain an endorsed Certificate of Inspection and/or
Compliance issued by the USCG. As of 2019, the Coast Guard’s LNG inspection
workforce was able to meet the demand of LNG inspections for all LNG vessels
entering and leaving U.S. ports. However, the need for forecasting future workforce
levels is critical in maintaining the degree of regulation required to keep the LNG
industry safe and secure. As a government agency, understanding future budgetary
needs is vital for the Coast Guard as the Coast Guard’s budget is finite and has been
in a “declining resource environment” [2]. With an average salary of $80,000USD, a
qualified marine inspector requires significant amount of time and money on behalf
of the Coast Guard to qualify and certify an efficient workforce. This comes at a
critical time for the service as the LNG industry is growing at a fast rate as the
number of commissioned vessels are increasing at a yearly rate and the size of the
vessels are increasing as infrastructure and demand for natural gas increases around
the world.
3.2.2 Objective
The objective of this case study is to analyze the future demand for Coast
Guard LNG inspectors through utilization of the World Gas Model. With the
World Gas Model, the cost for both the LNG industry and the Coast Guard will
be determined. The relationship between the LNG industry and the Coast Guard’s
regulation therein will be analyzed through the use of additional complementarity
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conditions and variables specific to this case study. WGM results will be compared
against current forecasting developed by the USCG Liquefied Gas Carrier National
Center of Expertise (LGCNCOE).
3.2.3 Analysis & Results
In order to perform the analysis forecasting USCG workforce requirements, a
new complementarity condition and variables were developed. First, the USCG’s
value of LNG vessel inspections was developed using the variable USCG
B
lm which
represents the yearly number of LNG vessel inspections completed (#vesselinspections
year
).
This variable is computed for each time period based on a user-specified growth




Guard LNG inspection rate was found through data provided by the LGCNCOE
and computed from the total number of LNG inspections completed in 2017 and
the number of active qualified LNG inspectors. Next, this rate is multiplied by the
current number of certified LNG inspectors for the base year value. Future USCG
B
lm
values are determined via a growth rate formula based on a user-supplied growth
rate.
The additional complementarity condition was placed into the WGM in order
to model the relationship between the Coast Guard’s inspection availability to the
number of LNG inspections required by industry. The developed complementarity
condition found in Eq. 3.2 represents an upper-bound to the amount of inspections
required by industry subject to the availability of the number of USCG inspec-
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tions for each time period in the model. The number of required inspections is
found by taking the amount LNG to be transported by the LNG shipping opera-
tor LNGFLOW
B
crljdm divided by vessel capacity ShipCap
C
c which provides a unit
of (#vesselinspections
year
) for computation of the complementarity condition, Eq. 3.2.
The dual variable λ
B
m represents the congestion fee
$USD
vessel/yr imposed on the LNG
shipping operator implemented in Eq. 3.3. The units for this dual variable were
determined by taking the units for the LNG shipping operator’s objective function
discounted$USD over the units of the complementarity condition (#vesselinspections
year
).
Eq. 3.3 replaces the previously used LNG shipping operator’s complementarity con-
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} ⊥ SALESBcrljdm ≥ 0 ∀c, d,m
(3.3)
Several cases were designed in order to properly analyze the full extent of the
Coast Guard’s future LNG inspection workforce forecast. In Fig. 3.19, the various
cases designed are represented in terms of their defining factor, LNG inspection
workforce growth rate per annum. Case studies were selected around the USCG
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LGCNCOE’s current use of 7.5% growth rate per annum used to forecast future
LNG inspection workforce needs [63].
Figure 3.19: USCG Case Study Breakdown
First, the number of inspections per year determined as a result from the
WGM was analyzed in order to further understand the workforce demand imposed
on the Coast Guard by the LNG industry.
2
In Fig. 3.20, the number of inspections
increase per year by case in relation to the rise in the growth rate of the USCG
2
The USCG number of inspections are based on a provided forecast from the USCG LGCNCOE
up to 2022, future number of inspections were extrapolated out to 2032.
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inspection workforce. This implies that with an increasing rate of growth by the
USCG inspection workforce, industry will be able to grow at a greater rate in relation
and provides a connection between the USCG workforce and the LNG industry.
Figure 3.20: Number of USCG Inspections by Year & Case
Moving forward in the analysis, the determined number of inspectors as a
result of the WGM was analyzed in order to further understand the implications of
the Coast Guard’s current forecasting against the results from the WGM. In Fig.
3.21, the number of required inspectors for the “USCG” case represents the number
forecasted by the LGCNCOE. Comparative to the “USCG” case, cases 20, 15 and
10 demonstrate similar results found in Fig. 3.20. The results indicate that as the
USCG workforce grows at a faster rate, industry’s demand on the USCG, in the form
of the number of LNG inspections required, also increases at at more accelerated
rate. A conclusion made from Fig. 3.21 is that the USCG’s workforce forecasting,
with a growth rate of 7.5% per annum, is on par with the WGM results from case
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“7.5” demonstrating validity of results found by the WGM.
Figure 3.21: Number of Required USCG Inspectors by Year & Case
In order to properly understand the relationship between the USCG LNG
inspection workforce and the effect of it’s growth on the LNG industry, an analysis
on the dual variable, λ
B
m representing the congestion fee
$USD
vessel/yr imposed on LNG
shipping operators, must be made.
In Fig. 3.22, it is shown that as the USCG’s LNG inspection workforce grows at
a rate ≥ 15% per annum, the dual variable remains at zero. With λ
B
m = 0, the effects
of the additional KKT condition and constraint, Eqs. 3.2 and 3.3, are negligible
as the nature of complementarity constraints dictate that if the constraint is not
active, the dual variable goes to zero, meaning that the gas market is unaffected
by the additional constraint imposed by the USCG conditions in the WGM. This
is significant when compared to the dual variable’s values for growth rates ≤ 10%
per annum, where the imposed cost on the LNG shipping operator spans from $6k
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USD to $20k USD. What this means for both industry and the USCG is that in
order for the USCG to enable the LNG industry to grow unrestricted with the
requirement of LNG vessel inspections, the USCG LNG inspection workforce must
grow somewhere between 33% and 100% greater than that of which it currently
forecasts. If the USCG, according to WGM results, were to continue to expand
it’s LNG inspection workforce at the current forecasted rate of 7.5%, case 7.5%, it
would impose a cost, in the form of time and/or money, on industry and inhibit a
degree of growth desired by industry.
Figure 3.22: USCG Inspection Congestion Fee by USCG Case Study & Year
The major takeaway from this case study is that if the Coast Guard seeks to
meet industry’s demand with enough inspectors so that industry is not constrained
by the availability of inspections, the Coast Guard LNG inspection workforce must
grow at a rate between 10% and 15% anywhere from 33% - 100% greater than what
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is currently being forecasted by the USCG. This can be seen visually through Fig.
3.23, where the median
3
number of inspectors available represents the availability of
inspectors by the USCG when the workforce is grown at the respective case growth
rate versus the median number of required inspectors as a result from industry’s
demand determined by the WGM. Only considering the increase in payroll expenses,
the disparity between the Coast Guard’s planned workforce growth rate and minimal
required growth rate determined via results from WGM is equivalent to an increase
in over $1.4 Million USD to the USCG’s annual operating budget4. This number
increases significantly when factoring in the additional costs of training, health care,
and operational expenses that come with an increase in workforce size.
3
Median taken instead of average in an effort to avoid skewness due to the limited number of
data points
4
The FY 2020 President’s Budget requests $11.34 billion for the Coast Guard, including $9.32
billion in discretionary funding [62].
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Figure 3.23: Required vs. Available Number of Inspectors
3.2.3.1 USCG & U.S.-China Trade War
Highlighting the flexibility and capability of the WGM, the two case studies
discussed in the thesis are briefly analyzed in regards to the effect of the U.S.-China
trade war on the Coast Guard’s LNG inspection workforce. In Fig. 3.24, it can be
seen that while subject to the most restrictive conditions found in the U.S. - China
trade war case study,
5
the USCG’s forecasted LNG inspection workforce’s effect on
the LNG industry remains unchanged as demonstrated by the determined values of




Case 2: 25% tariff on U.S. imports to China w/ 150% of reference Chinese domestic production
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Figure 3.24: USCG Case Study Results under Case 2 of Trade War
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Chapter 4: Summary
4.1 Summary of Results
This thesis explored the uses of mixed complementary modeling specifically
through deployment of the WGM. Exploring the dynamics of the U.S.-China Trade
War in 2019, the WGM determined the short and long term effects of a prolonged
trade war under several different scenarios. The overall results of this case study
illustrated the tariff imposed by China on U.S. LNG exports does not hold any
significance directly to the U.S. or China regardless of the tariff amount. The only
visible effect that can be seen as a direct result of the tariffs would be an increase in
alternative LNG sourcing by China, most notably Australia and the United States’
refocus of LNG exports towards other markets of high profitability such as Japan.
The most significant result that came from the case study was the global effect
of an increase in Chinese domestic natural gas production. It was shown that a
production increase to levels prescribed by the Chinese State Council would result
in a rise in consumer surplus around the world, most significantly for countries with
high levels of natural gas imports. In conclusion, the major result that can be drawn
from the successful WGM analysis into the U.S. and China trade war is that while
the tariffs do restrict the amount of LNG flow from the U.S. to China, the tariffs
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hold no adverse effect on either country; however, the geopolitical consequences that
could arise and elevate China’s motivation to increase domestic gas production are
of greater significance for the entire global market.
The use of the WGM to analyze future workforce demands demonstrated the
flexibility and capability of the WGM to be used in a variety of applications be-
yond previous conventional use. Through the case study, the WGM determined
the significance of the U.S. Coast Guard’s growth of it’s LNG inspection workforce.
This was shown through comparison of current USCG forecasting statistics and the
output of the WGM. Made successful through the use of additional KKT conditions
and variables never previously implemented into the WGM. The significance of the
results come at a time when the Coast Guard is subject to a declining resource en-
vironment [2] and is regularly competing for additional funding from congress while
amidst a growing LNG industry [16]. In conclusion, the USCG LNG inspection
workforce should grow at a rate or otherwise increase the efficiency of inspections at
a greater rate than currently performed and forecasted in order to avoid an adverse
effect on the LNG industry through vessel inspection availability.
4.2 Contributions
The principal contributions that this thesis provides are of benefit for individ-
uals in both the energy industry and academia. One of the major contributions is
the modernization and further development of the WGM, which is one of the few
MCP models that is able to accurately employ imperfect competition in modeling of
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the global natural gas market. The use of a mixed complementarity problem model
to forecast the short-term and long-term effects of a prolonged trade war between
the United States and China demonstrates the applicability of the WGM to address
some of the major issues facing the natural gas industry as they arise, benefiting
those seeking to understand the future implications of real-time events and decisions.
This research has also demonstrated the flexibility of the WGM and broadened the
range of stakeholders surrounding the modeling of the gas market through the anal-
ysis performed for the USCG LNG inspection workforce. This analysis has provided
a new lens and way of thinking surrounding use of the WGM for decision making
and forecasting.
4.3 Future Work
Implementing USCG or a fellow government player representing a regulatory
stakeholder within the natural gas market is the source of continue WGM expansion
and development. The case study regarding USCG workforce forecasting uncovered
potential for development of an additional player that interacts with other players in
the market through regulatory fees. This player could hold weight in all facets of the
natural gas supply chain placing taxes on industry in the form of “green” initiatives
and other political agendas as well as regulatory fees as seen in the USCG case
study.
Expanding the endogenous market access decisions are a continued source
for further development. This area of research could focus on developing country
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decisions to expand or contract the variety of players within their domestic market
as well as their level of market access. Endogenous decision making expansion could
include pipeline creation, player additions & subtraction, and new market access
points. The benefit from further research into endogenous decision making could
potentially help identify potential areas for global gas market development, therefore
benefiting the entire gas ecosystem.
As a result of the thesis research process and further understanding of the
WGM an opportunity to further increase the WGM’s depiction of the real-world
gas market would be to integrate source diversity variables for importing and ex-
porting countries. The diversity variables could act similar to the WGM’s unique
market power variables. These diversity variables could help model some of the non-
optimal decisions made by players in regards to natural gas trade. For example, the
implementation would help analyze the effects of Japanese LNG import source di-
versity as a function of increasing resiliency and lowering the lack of dependency on
one individual LNG source.
Recent events in 2020 have unfolded the inter-dependency of the global sup-
ply chain and underlying volatility of the natural gas markets. Future research in
relation to the WGM and mixed complementary modeling could revolve around
better forecasting of short and long-term economic effects surrounding pandemics
and global financial crises.
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Appendix A: Karush-Kuhn-Tucker & Market-Clearing Conditions
A.1 KKT - Producer
0 ≤ daysd {γm [−πn(p)dm + CPpm] + βPpm} + αpdm ⊥ SALESPpdm ≥ 0 ∀d,m (P1)
0 ≤ CAP
PR
pm − daysd {SALESPpdm} ⊥ αpdm ≥ 0 ∀d,m (P2)
0 ≤ CAP
PH
pm − daysd {SALESPpdm} ⊥ βPpdm ≥ 0 ∀d,m (P3)
A.1.1 Market Clearing - Producer
0 = daysd {SALESPpdm − PURCHP→Ttndm − PURCHP→Llndm} ⊥ πPn(p)dm ≥ 0 ∀d,m
(MCC P)
88
A.2 KKT - Trader













]} + φTtndm ⊥ SALESTtndm ≥ 0 ∀n, d,m
(T Sales)
0 ≤ daysd {γm [πn(p)dm]} − φTtndm ⊥ PURCHP→Tpdm ≥ 0 ∀d,m (P→ T Purch)
0 ≤ daysd {γm [πn(r)dm]} − φTtndm ⊥ PURCHR→Trdm ≥ 0 ∀d,m (R→ T Purch)
0 ≤ daysd {γm [τSIndm]} + φTtndm − (1 − lossn)daysdφStnm ⊥ INJTtndm ≥ 0 ∀d,m
(T → S Inj)
0 ≤ daysd {γm [τSXndm]} + φTtndm + daysdφStnm ⊥ XTRTtndm ≥ 0 ∀d,m (S → T Xtr)































tndm ≥ 0 ∀n, d,m
(Storage Cycle)
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A.3 KKT - Liquefier




]} + αLldm + φLldm ⊥ SALESLldm ≥ 0 ∀d,m (L1)











ldm ≥ 0 ∀d,m (L3)




















lm ≥ 0 ∀m (L Capacity)
A.3.1 Market Clearing - Liquefier










rljdm} ⊥ πLldm ≥ 0 ∀l, d,m
(MCC L)
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A.4 LNG Shipping Operator











} ⊥ SALESBcrljdm ≥ 0 ∀c, d,m
(B1S)
0 ≤ (CAPBc ∗MaxDistc)−∑
r,l,j
(LNGFLOWBcrljdm ∗Distrlj) ⊥ αcdm ≥ 0 ∀c, d,m
(Boat)
0 ≤ (γmβBm) − ∑
d,m′>m


















) ⊥ λBlm ≥ 0 ∀l,m (USCG)





crljdm − LNGFLOWrljdm ⊥ τ
B
dm ≥ 0 ∀d,m (MCC B)
A.5 Regasifier
0 ≤ γmDaysd (CRrm − πRrdm) + αRrdm + φRrdm ⊥ SALESR→Mrndm ≥ 0 ∀dm (R1M)
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0 ≤ γmDaysd (CRnm − πRSndm) + αRndm + φRndm ⊥ SALESR→Trndm ≥ 0 ∀d,m (R1T)
0 ≤ γmDaysd (πLldm + τBrljdm) + εRrldm+ ([1 − LossR] ∗ [1 − LossB])φRrdm (R2)
⊥ LNGFLOW
R





























rdm ≥ 0 ∀d,m (R3)
0 ≤∑
l,j
















rdm ≥ 0 ∀d,m (R Contracts)











ndm ≥ 0 ∀d,m (MCC R)
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A.6 Storage Operator
0 ≤ −daysdγm (τSIsdm − CSsm) + αSIsdm ⊥ SALESSIsdm ≥ 0 ∀d,m
(Sales Storage Injection)










sm ≥ 0 ∀m









sm ≥ 0 ∀m











sm ≥ 0 ∀m








































sm ≥ 0 ∀m (Working Expansion)
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sdm ≥ 0 ∀d,m (MCC Storage Extraction)
A.7 Canal Operator








pcanal,d,m ≥ 0 ∀d,m (C2P)








scanal,d,m ≥ 0 ∀d,m (C2S)
















scanal,d,m ≥ 0 ∀d,m
(MCC Suez Canal)
A.8 Transmission System Operator







a dm ⊥ α
A







am ≥ 0 ∀d,m (A Capacity)
0 ≤ γm [∑
dεD
(daysdτAadm) + βAam] + ρAam ⊥ CAPAam ≥ 0 ∀d,m (A Investment)









adm ≥ 0 ∀d,m
(MCC Transmission System Operator)



















Figure B.1: WGM Consumer Surplus - Americas
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Figure B.2: WGM Consumer Surplus - Central Asia
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Figure B.3: WGM Consumer Surplus - Middle East
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Figure B.4: WGM Consumer Surplus - Africa
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Appendix C: Sets
Table C.1: WGM Variable Sets
Set Definition
α ∈ A Pipeline Arcs i to j (e.g., capacity)
c ∈ C LNG carrier shipping sizes (e.g., s ship, m ship, l ship)
d ∈ D demand seasons (e.g., low, high)
j ∈ J LNG shipping route (e.g., Scanal,Pcanal,Nocanal)
l ∈ L liquefier (liquefaction nodes)
m ∈M year
n ∈ N model node
p ∈ P producer
r ∈ R regasifier (regasification nodes)
s ∈ S storage facility (storage operators)
t ∈ T traders
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Appendix D: Variables
Table D.1: WGM Variables
Variable Remark
CanalDist distance from start to end of Panama Canal
C
B
cm(⋅) shipping (LNG) cost function
C
canal
dm (⋅) canal operating cost function
C
P canal
jdm Panama Canal operating cost function
C
S canal
jdm Suez Canal operating cost function
C
L
lm(⋅) liquefaction cost function
C
P
pm(⋅) production cost function
C
R
rm(⋅) regasification cost function
CAP
A
am arc (i.e., pipe) capacity (mcm/d)
CAP
B
cm LNG shipping capacity (mcm/d)
CAP
B
c LNG shipping capacity (mcm/d)
CAP
CJ
jm canal capacity (mcm/d)
CAP
L
lm liquefaction capacity (mcm/d)
Continued on next page
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Table D.1 – continued from previous page
Variable Definition
CAP
P canal Panama Canal Capacity after converted to mcm/d
ShipCAP
C
c Individual ship of size c capacity mcm LNG
CAP
R





S canal Suez Canal Capacity after converted to mcm/d
CAP
SI
sm Maximum storage injection capacity (mcm/d)
CAP
SX
sm Maximum storage extraction capacity (mcm/d)
LNGDEST
R
rldm LNG shipment under contract from node l to node r
(mcm/d)
daysd number of days in a season




tadm arc flow by a trader (mcm/d)
INJ
T
tndm Storage injection flow by a trader (mcm/d)
INT
W
ndm intercept of inverse demand curve (mcm/d)
LNGFLOW
B
crljdm LNG transported from node l to node r through route
j (mcm/d)
lossa loss rate of gas in the transport arc, la ∈ [0, 1)
lossl loss rate of liquefaction process ll ∈ [0, 1)
Continued on next page
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Table D.1 – continued from previous page
Variable Definition
losss loss rate of gas storage injection, ls ∈ [0, 1)
lossr loss rate of regasification process lr ∈ [0, 1)
losslrj loss rate of LNG transportation via LNGarc j from l to
r
PP Ppm Maximum daily production capacity (mcm/d)




ldm Quantity bought from a producer by a liquefier (mcm/d)
PURCH
T←P
tndm quantity bought from a producer by a trader (mcm/d)
PURCH
T←R
tdm quantity bought from a regasifier by a trader (mcm/d)
SALES
A
adm quantity transported via arc a (mcm/d)
SALES
B
crljdm LNG transported from liquefier l to node r through
route j by LNG shipper c (mcm/d)
SALES
canal→B








dm Suez Canal capacity assigned for use by LNG trans-
porters (mcm/d)
Continued on next page
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ldm quantity sold to regasifiers by a liquefier (mcm/d)
SALES
P




rdm quantity sold to Markets by regasifiers (mcm/d)
SALES
R→T
rdm quantity sold to traders by regasifiers (mcm/d)
SALES
SI








tndm quantity sold to end-user markets by traders (mcm/d)
SLP
W
ndm slope of the inverse demand curve (mcm/d/k$)
WG
S
sm Maximum storage working gas capacity (mcm/d)
XTR
T
tndm quantity extracted from storage by a trader (mcm/d)
△Aam arc capacity expansion (mcm/d)
△Aam′ future arc capacity expansion (mcm/d)
△
A
am upper bound of arc capacity expansion (mcm/d)
△SIsnm storage injection capacity expansion (mcm/d)
△SIsm′ future storage injection capacity expansion (mcm/d)
△
SI
sm upper bound of injection capacity expansion (mcm/d)
Continued on next page
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Table D.1 – continued from previous page
Variable Definition
△SXsnm storage extraction capacity expansion (mcm/d)
△SXsm′ future storage extraction capacity expansion (mcm/d)
△
SX
sm upper bound of extraction capacity expansion (mcm/d)
△SWsnm storage working gas capacity expansion (mcm/d)
△SWsm′ future storage working gas capacity expansion (mcm/d)
△
SW
sm upper bound of working gas capacity expansion
(mcm/d)
△Rrm regasification capacity expansion (mcm/d)
△Rrm′ future regasification capacity expansion (mcm/d)
△
R
rm upper bound of regasification capacity expansion costs
(mcm/d)
△Llm liquefaction capacity expansion (mcm/d)
△Llm′ future liquefaction capacity expansion (mcm/d)
△
L
lm upper bound of liquefaction capacity expansion costs
(mcm/d)
△Ppm production capacity expansion (mcm/d)
△
P
pm upper bound of production capacity expansion (mcm)
△Bcm LNG transportation capacity expansion (mcm/d)
△Bcm′ future LNG transportation capacity expansion (mcm/d)
Continued on next page
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adm dual variable of arc capacity constraints
α
A
adm′ future dual variable of arc capacity constraints
α
B
cdm dual variable of LNG shipping capacity restrictions
α
canal
dm dual variable of canal capacity constraints
α
P canal
jdm dual variable of Panama Canal capacity constraints
α
S canal
jdm dual variable of Suez Canal capacity constraints
α
cost
pm linear term in production cost function
α
L
ldm dual variable of liquefaction capacity restrictions
α
P
pm dual variable of production capacity restrictions
α
R
rdm dual variable of regasification capacity restrictions
α
SI
sdm dual variable of storage injection capacity constraints
α
SX
sdm′ dual variable of storage extraction capacity constraints
α
SX
sdm dual variable of storage extraction capacity constraints
α
SW
sm dual variable of working gas capacity constraints
α
SW
sdm′ dual variable of future working gas capacity constraints
α
+(n) gas transportation sent to node n
α
−(n) gas transportation sent from node n
Continued on next page
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cm LNG shipping capacity expansion costs (k$/mcm)
b
B
am arc capacity expansion costs (k$/mcm)
b
L
lm LNG shipping capacity expansion costs (k$/mcm)
b
P
pm production capacity expansion costs (k$/mcm)
b
R
rm regasification capacity expansion costs (k$/mcm)
b
SI
sm storage injection capacity expansion costs (k$/mcm)
b
SX
sm storage extraction capacity expansion costs (k$/mcm)
b
SW
sm storage working gas capacity expansion costs (k$/mcm)
β
B




pm quadratic cost term in production cost function
β
PH
p dual variable of production capacity over time horizon
γm discount rate for yearm, γm ∈ (0, 1]
δ
C
tn level of market power exerted by a trader in a market,
δ
C
tn ∈ [0, 1]
ε
R
rldm dual variable for LNG contract constraints
π
L
n(l)dm market-clearing price for LNG trade ($/kcm)
π
P
n(p)dm market-clearing price between gas producers and traders
Continued on next page
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ndm wholesale prices ($/kcm)
ϕ
S
tndm dual variable of storage balance constraints
ϕ
T
tndm dual variable of mass balance constraints
φ
L
ldm dual variable of LNG sale by liquefiers
φ
R
rdm dueal variable of LNG sale by regasifiers -
ρ
A
am dual variable of arc capacity expansion
ρ
B
cm dual variable of LNG shipping capacity expansion
ρ
L
lm dual variable of LNG liquefaction capacity expansion
ρ
P
pm dual variable of production capacity expansion
ρ
R
rm dual variable of regasification capacity expansion
ρ
SI
m dual variable of storage injection capacity expansion
ρ
SX
m dual variable of storage extraction capacity expansion
ρ
SW
m dual variable of storage working gas capacity expansion
τ
A
adm dual prices of transportation arc (k/kcm)
τ
A,reg
adm regulated fee for arc usage (k$/mcm)
τ
B
rljdm dual variable of LNG transportation cost
τ
Pcanalcon
dm congestion fees for Panama Canal usage
Continued on next page
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jdm canal fees for Panama Canal usage
τ
Scanalcon
dm congestion fees for Suez Canal usage
τ
Scanaltoll
jdm canal fees for Suez Canal usage
τ
SI
sndm dual prices of storage injection ($/kcm)
τ
SX
sndm dual prices of storage extraction ($/kcm)
τ
SI,reg
sdm regulated fee for storage injection (k$/mcm)
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